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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE IN MISSOURI:
THE OLD AND THE NEW
I. INTRODUaTION
The purpose of this comment is to examine the new Missouri "no
fault" divorce statute which went into effect on January 1, 1975, and to
determine its impact on awards of spousal maintenance. In addition
to sweeping changes in the grounds and procedures for dissolving a mar-
riage, the new statute will have a substantial effect on the granting of
maintenance. Following a brief discussion of the prior Missouri law of
alimony, the maintenance section of the new Missouri statute' will be
examined point by point. The impact of the new maintenance provision
will then be considered. Due to the recentness of the enactment of the
Missouri statute it will be necessary to rely heavily upon interpretations
from other states having similar statutes.
11. PRIOR Missousu Lw
The traditional rule in most states was that alimony could be awarded
only to the wife. Although evidence of need and ability to pay were
considered, alimony was usually granted absent misconduct on the part
of the wife. This attitude toward the granting of alimony was based on
the traditional rule that upon marriage the husband undertook a legal
obligation to support his wife. This obligation was not terminated by
divorce, but was satisfied thereafter by payment of alimony.2
Missouri courts also permitted awards of alimony only to the wife, but
contrary to the general rule, the granting of such was not based on the
husband's continuing duty of support. Marriage was considered a contract
which obligated the husband to support his wife for their mutual lives.
Divorce was a rescission of this contract based on a breach by one party.
The rights and obligations of both parties under the marriage contract
were thereby terminated. Alimony was an allowance to compensate the
wife for the loss of her contractual right to support.3
Even under prior Missouri law, a wife did not have an absolute right
to receive alimony. It was sometimes stated that a divorced wife capable
of providing for herself could not insist that her husband maintain her
in "idleness and luxury" 4 simply because he was found to be the guilty
party. The granting of alimony was determined in each case in light of
the particular circumstances.5 Alimony was usually awarded to an "in-
nocent and injured" wife when reasonable to do so.6
1. § 452.355, RSMo 1973 Supp.
2. 24 Am. JuR. 2d, Divorce and Separation §§ 514, 521 (1966).
3. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 421, 221 S.W. 1066, 1069 (1920); Knebel v.
Knebel, 189 S.W.2d 464, 467-68 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945). But see Bowzer v. Bowzer,
236 Mo. App. 514, 522, 155 S.W.2d 530, 534 (K.G. Ct. App. 1941).
4. Shilkett v. Shilkett, 285 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
5. Id.
6. Adkins v. Adkins, 325 S.W.2d 364, 367 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
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Under prior Missouri law the husband was required to pay alimony,
within his financial ability, sufficient to maintain the wife in her pre-
divorce standard of living. The phrase "husband's financial ability" meant
that alimony should not exceed the amount that he could pay without
undue hardship. The husband was entitled to retain an amount adequate
to support himself on a standard similar to that of the wife.7 To be more
concise, the husband was not to be improverished in order to support the
wife at the pre-divorce standard of living.8
The proper yardstick for the measurement of alimony was the hus-
band's earning capacity, not his actual income at the time of divorce. 9 The
husband's temporary inability to pay was no bar to alimony. Present and
past earnings as well as future prospects were evidence of earning capacity.1o
Although any income of the wife was considered in determining the
amount of alimony, she had no affirmative duty to seek work. Another
rule, often expounded but even more frequently breached, was that the
husband's misconduct was not to be considered as the basis for increasing
the amount of alimony."
III. THE NEvw MissouRi MAiNTENANcE STATUTE
A. Types of New Maintenance Statutes
Missouri is only one of several states that have recently enacted "no
fault" divorce laws containing new provisions concerning maintenance.
The new provisions are of two basic types. Florida and Iowa, for example,
have generally worded statutes, which leave to the courts the determination
of criteria for granting awards of maintenance. 12 Other states such as Mis-
7. H. CLAm, LAw or Do mnc RELATIONS 444 (1968).
8. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 469 S.W.2d 852, 855 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
9. Weiss v. Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646, 647 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
10. Id.; Rutlader v. Rutlader, 411 S.W.2d 826, 829 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
Missouri courts compiled the following extensive list of factors relevant to an
award of alimony: (1) the financial status of the parties: Spivack v. Spivack, 283
S.W.2d 137, 142 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); (2) their stations in life: id.; (3) income,
obligtions, and necessities of each: id.; (4) the extent of their individual estates,
particularly property given by the husband to the wife: Rutlader v. Rutlader,
supra at 830; Patterson v. Patterson, 215 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Spr. Mo. App. 1948);(5) contributions of each spouse to property accumlated during the marriage:
Knebel v. Knebel, 189 S.W.2d 464, 467 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945); (6) any rights
acquired by the wife in her husband's realty by virtue of the marriage-e.g., dower:
Coggburn v. Coggbum, 256 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Spr. Mo. App. 1953); (7) the ages
and health of the parties: Spivack v. Spivack, supra at 142; (8) their education
and employment or business experience: Adkins v. Adkins, 325 S.W.2d 366 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1959); (9) the ability of each to follow gainful occupations: Spivack v.
Spivack, supra at 142; (10) probable future prospects of each: id.; (11) children
and their custodial provisions: Mortensen v. Mortensen, 469 S.W.2d 852, 854
(K.C. Mo. App. 1971); (12) ages of the children: Sieckmann v. Sieckmann, 429
S.W.2d 784, 787 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); (13) duration of the marriage and
whether it was one of convenience or one of affection: Spivack v. Spivack, supra
at 142; and (14) conduct of the parties, particularly with regard to the causes of
the divorce: id.
11. McM. v. McM., 506 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08' (Supp. 1974-75) provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant
1976]
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souri, Kentucky, and Oregon, lay down a nonexclusive list of relevant
factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness and amount
of a maintenance award.18 The difference between the two types of
statutes appears to be solely one of form. The courts applying the generally
worded statutes have judicially adopted criteria1 4 similar to those enum-
erated in the more specific statutes.
alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or perma-
nent in nature. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic
payments or payments in lump sum or both. The court may consider
the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining
whether alimony shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of
alimony, if any, to be awarded to such spouse.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony, the court may consider
any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
IowA CoDE: ANN. § 598.21 (Supp. 1975-76) provides: "When a dissolution of mar-
riage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children,
property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified."
13. § 452.335, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides:
1. In a proceeding for nonretroactive invalidity, dissolution of marriage
or legal separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolu-
tion of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order to either
spouse, but only if it find that the spouse seeking maintenance
(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property appor-
tioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employ-
ment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment outside the home.
2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods
of time as the court deems just, and after considering all relevant
factors including:
(1)'The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including marital property apportioned to him, and his
ability to meet his needs independently, including the
extent to which a provision for support of a child living
with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;*
(2) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or train-
ing to enable the party seeking maintenance to, find appro-
priate employment;
(8) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) The duration of the marriage; . ' '
(5) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance; k
(6) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and,
(7) The conduct of a party seeking maintenapce during the
marriage.
Ky. R v. STAT. § 403.200 (Supp. 1974), whichis also based on section 308 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, is similar but makes no mention of the
consideration of fault. The Uniform Act itself specifically. excludes any con
sideration of fault. Orgeon has its own list of criteria not derived from the Uniform
Act, but also excluding fault. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 107.105 (Supp. 1974).
14. Iowa uses separate lists of premarital and postmarital criteria found in
Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1968). However, fault was stricken
from consideration in Izn're Marriage of Williams,' 199 N.W.2d, 339 (IoWa 1972).
[Vol. 41
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B. Criteria for Awarding Maintenance
In general, the statutes contemplate that, if possible, the division of
property will provide for the needs of both spouses. 15 Missouri,' 6 and the
other states whose statutes are based on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, provide that prior to considering the enumerated factors relevant to
the amount of maintenance, the court must find that the spouse seeking
maintenance cannot support himself by "appropriate employment' 17 or
out of his property.'8 In the absence of such a finding, the court is not
authorized to make any award of maintenance whatsoever.19 If the court
determines that the requesting spouse lacks sufficient property to provide
adequate support, it must then determine that spouse's earning ability.20
Under the new Missouri statute, an able requesting spouse is not only
required to support himself, he also has an affirmative duty to acquire the
skills necessary to obtain suitable employment. 21 Where the spouse has
a proven ability to meet his established needs, a maintenance award is
improper.22 However, if the spouse seeking maintenance is unable to hold
a job due to physical or mental infirmities, the court may properly grant
permanent maintenance.23
The new law does not restrict maintenance to those situations where
the requesting spouse is unable to obtain employment.24 In Casper v.
Casper25 the court faced the problem of a wife who was able to support
herself, but only at a level below her previous standard of living. The
court reasoned that one who is able to maintain only the bare necessities
of life is not required to forfeit all right to maintenance. The court should
first determine the proper amount necessary to support the requesting
spouse according to the standard of living during the marriage. That
spouse's reasonable earning capacity should then be deducted from this
amount in order to arrive at the amount of the final award. The Casper
court may have considered the standard of living during the marriage in
determining whether to grant maintenance. The marital standard of liv-
ing is listed not as a criterion for determining whether to award mainte-
15. Farmer v. Farmer, 506 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1974).
16. § 452.335.1, RSMo 1973 Supp.
17. The term "appropriate employment" is not defined in the Missouri
statute. However, the note to section 808 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act suggests that appropriate employment means "employment appropriate to
his skills and interests." In addition, in determining what kind of employment
is appropriate the court should consider his age, health, social standing, and any
other relevant factors.
18. See In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975).
19. § 452.335.1 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp.
20. Ruhland, Maintenance and Support, 29 J. Mo. B. 516 (1973).
21. § 452.335.2 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp.
22. Weston v. Weston, 251 So. 2d 315 (Fla. App. 1971).
23. Bob v. Bob, 310 So. 2d 328, 329-30 (Fla. App. 1975); Dash v. Dash,
284 So. 2d 407, 408-09 (Fla. App. 1973).
24. Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. App. 1975).
25. 510 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1974).
1976]
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nance, but as a factor to be considered in determining the amount of the
award. Nevertheless, consideration of the marital standard of living in
determining whether to award maintenance would be proper because this
standard is quite relevant in determining the reasonable needs of the
requesting spouse.
The Missouri statute, and others based on the Uniform Act, specifically
state that maintenance is proper where the requesting spouse is the cus-
todian of children whose "condition or circumstances" make it appropriate
that their custodian not work outside the home.26 The drafters of the
Arizona statute wisely modified this provision to expressly make the child's
age a factor which would make it inappropriate for the custodian to seek
outside work.& 2 Although the Missouri statute does not make a specific
reference to the age of a child, the language is certainly subject to the
interpretation that a child's age is a "condition or circumstance" within
the meaning of the statute.28
C. Factors for Determining the Amount of Maintenance
The relevant factors listed in section 452.335.2, RSMo 1975 Supp.,
are to be considered only in determining the amount and duration of a
maintenance award, and not the initial appropriateness of such.2 0 It should
be re-emphasized here that the listed criteria are not exclusive. The court
must consider all relevant factors including those listed.
The requesting spouse's financial resources, property as well as earn-
ing ability, must be considered in determining the amount and duration
of maintenance.8 0 Recognizing the fact that a spouse may lack sufficient
training to earn an adequate income, or may no longer be qualified to
return to a pre-marriage occupation, the drafters of the new statutes pro-
vided for limited duration or "rehabilitative" maintenance to allow the
spouse time in which to obtain the training necessary to resume a previous
profession or enter a new career.8 1 In In re Marriage of Beeh8 2 the court
awarded maintenance for a period of time sufficient to enable the wife
to get a master's degree needed to resume a career as a nursing teacher.
In Bohanan v. Bohanan83 the court awarded maintenance for one year to
allow the wife time to "brush up" and requalify as a stenographer. In
another case, the court awarded maintenance to a forty-one year old un-
skilled wife for a period of six years to enable her to develop job skills
and become employable.8 4 Where a wife earned $6000 per year but needed
to return to school to maximize her employment potential, the court
26. § 452.335.1 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp.
27. Axuz. R. v. STAT. § 25-39 A.2 (Supp. 1973).
28. Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Ky. 1973).
29. § 452.335.2 (1), RSMo 1973 Supp.
30. § 452.335.2, RSMo 1973 Supp.
31. See § 452.335.2 (2), RSMo 1973 Supp.
32. 214 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1974).
33. 6 Ore. App. 141, 487 P.2d 113 (1971).
34. In re Marriage of Aasum, 17 Ore. App. 658, 523 P.2d 581, 583 (1974).
[Vol. 41
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affirmed an award of maintenance to terminate at the end of the school
year. 5
Although the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the
marriage is an important factor,8 6 the court should be cautious in the
determination of such. In Bob v. Bob3 7 an award of alimony was reversed
because of the trial court's erroneous findings as to the pre-dissolution
standard of living. Large financial contributions by the wife's parents
had created a standard of living far beyond that which the husband alone
could have provided. The proper measure was that which would enable
the wife to maintain a standard which they could have maintained
without contribution from third parties.3 8
Occasionally the court will award less than necessary to maintain
the supported spouse at a previous standard of living that was unusually
high, even though the supporting spouse has the ability to pay. In Kennedy
v. Kennedy3 9 the court refused to increase the trial court's award of $500
per month for alimony and child support where the wife had considerable
property and earned $20,000 per year even though the husband's income
far exceeded that of the wife. The court apparently felt that she was
capable of supporting herself at an adequate standard although not equal
to that the husband was capable of providing.
The length of the marriage is another factor to be considered in deter-
mining the amount of a maintenance award. Where the marriage is short,
there is generally little change in the position of the parties during the
marriage. As aptly put by the Iowa Supreme Court in Behrle v. Behrle,40
the parties usually start with only earning ability and end with the same.
However, in a long marriage there are many other things to consider. In
Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer4' the court reasoned that the length of the
marriage was important because of two underlying factors: the contribu-
tion of the requesting spouse to the marriage and reluctance to award
maintenance to an adventuress. The requesting spouse's contribution to
the marriage, including any contribution as a homemaker, should be con-
sidered. 42 The length of the marriage also has relevance to the requesting
spouse's ability to recover opportunities foregone because of the marriage.
In addition to job training, experience, and security, these foregone oppor-
tunities may include retirement benefits and accumulated earnings that
result from continuous employment. The duration of the marriage also
35. In re Marriage of Scheer, 13 Ore. App. 551, 513 P 2d 174 (1973).
36. In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975).
37. Bob v. Bob, 310 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. App. 1975).
38. Id.
39. 303 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla, App. 1974).
40. 228 NW.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1975).
41. 22 Ariz. App. 238, 526 P.2d 762 (1974).
42. In -re Marriage of Aasum, 17 Ore. App. 658, 660, 523 P.2d 581, 583
(1974).
1976]
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directly correlates to the requesting spouse's ability to obtain future em-
ployment, or the training and education necessary to obtain such 4
The age and health, both physical and mental, of the requesting spouse
are important primarily because they pertain to the ability to be or to
become self-supporting. An older spouse who has long been a homemaker
would find it more difficult to acquire the skills necessary to become
economically self-sufficient than would a younger spouse. In addition, age
and/or infirmities may restrict or totally negate an older spouse's ability
to be self-supporting. These factors are also relevant in determining the
amount of maintenance because an older person, or one who has physical
or mental ailments, may have substantial medical expenses.
The ability of the supporting spouse to pay is an extremely important
limiting factor in this area. As was the rule under the prior Missouri law,
the court should not award maintenance in excess of the supporting spouse's
ability to pay even though this amount may be less than needed by the
supported spouse. 4 The supporting spouse should be left an amount ade-
quate to support himself on a standard similar to that of the supported
spouse.4 5 The court must recognize that in few cases will the income be
sufficient to support adequately two households. Although the desired
award is that which will enable the supported spouse to enjoy a standard
of living similar to that enjoyed during the marriage, the supporting spouse
has an equal right to live at that standard. Therefore, if the income is in-
adequate to independently support each spouse at such a level, both must
suffer a reduction in their standard of living.46 An additional concern
should be the avoidance of an award so large as to deprive the supporting
spouse of his incentive to maintain gainful employment.47
Although the court must consider whether there are children in the
home before granting a maintenance award, children and their circum-
stances are not listed as factors relevant to the duration and amount of
the award. Nevertheless, the courts will no doubt recognize that children
and their ages and conditions should be considered in shaping the award.
The fact that there are children in the home who need a fulltime cus-
todian may persuade the court that it would be advantageous for the
custodial spouse not to work. There are two views as to the length of
the award where there are children in the home. Some states, such as
Oregon, will award maintenance only until the youngest child enters
school.4 The theory underlying this approach is that once the children
are in school the custodian will be free to seek employment. Other states,
43. In re Marriage of Kitson, 17 Ore. App. 648, 655, 523 P.2d 575, 578-79
(1974).
44. Bob v. Bob, 310 So. 2d 328, 329-30 (Fla. App. 1975); Dash v. Dash, 284
So. 2d 407, 408-09 (Fla. App. 1973); Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 586 (Fla.
App. 1973).
45. H. CLARx, supra note 7, at 444. See notes 7-10 supra.
46. See Wright v. Wright, 13 Ore. App. 101, 508 P.2d 829 (1973).
47. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 238 S.W.2d 886, 891 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); Schwent
v. Schwent, 209 S.W.2d 546, 547 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
48. Wright v. Wright, 13 Ore. App. 101, 508 P.2d 829 (1978).
[Vol. 41
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such as Iowa, award maintenance until the children have all finished
high school. 49
Few authorities would dispute the relevance of the above factors or
the propriety of their consideration in determining the amount and dura-
tion of a maintenance award. However, there is much disagreement as to
the role of fault in making such a determination. This discord is based
on differing conceptions of the purpose of the "no fault" divorce statutes.
In In re Marriage of Williams5 O the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that to
allow consideration of fault in alimony proceedings would defeat the
purpose of "no fault" divorce statutes-i.e., the reduction of hostility and
trauma connected with marital failure. Allowing maintenance to be
awarded on fault grounds would increase both the disruptive impact of
the divorce and the mutual bitterness of the parties.51
Professor Robert Levy believes that fault as a criterion for awarding
alimony is inconsistent with the realities of marriage and divorce. He is
of the opinion that the consideration of fault permits one party to exact
an economic premium which has no relation to the parties' respective
financial positions.52 Considerations of fault are generally based on the
erroneous assumption that the breakdown of a marriage can be the sole
fault of one party. Generally, both parties contribute to the breakdown
of the marriage and the grounds for divorce are a result of the breakdown
of the marriage rather than the cause of it.53 At least one state, Iowa
refuses to allow consideration of fault even though not expressly pro-
hibited by statute.54 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act specifically
excludes consideration of the conduct of either spouse.5 5 Oregon has
adopted a similar provision. 56
Other authorities, however, argue that the purpose of "no fault"
divorce laws is merely to prevent withholding a divorce from a couple
whose marriage is no longer viable. Once the divorce is allowed, this pur-
pose is satisfied. Therefore, there is no reason to keep fault out at the
maintenance stage of the proceedings. The proponents of this view oppose
the complete elimination of fault and would retain its use to deny mainte-
nance where conduct makes an award grossly unfair.57 Michigan, after
enacting "no fault" grounds for divorce, still permits consideration of
fault for alimony purposes. 58
Florida has not eliminated fault and specifically permits consideration
49. Iu re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1974).
50. 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972).
51. H. CLARK, supra note 7, at 441-42.
52. R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYsis 150 (1968).
53. 199 N.W.2d at 345.
54. In -re Marriage of Zoellner, 219 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1974).
55. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE AcT § 308 (b).
56. KY. REv. STAT. § 403.200 (1) (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.105
(Supp. 1974).
57. Note, 53 NEB. L. R V. 126, 135-36 (1974).
58. Note, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 127, 131 (1973). 8
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of adultery.59 Under the new Kentucky statute, which omits any mention
of fault, the courts do not consider fault as to whether maintenance may
be awarded, but do consider it in determining the amount of the award.60
This position is far from logical. Missouri's new maintenance provision
permits consideration of the conduct of the spouse seeking maintenance.
This provision permits a denial of maintenance where the conduct of
the requesting spouse makes such an award inequitable.0 1
Nowhere does the Missouri statute prohibit consideration of the sup.
porting spouse's conduct in determining the amount of maintenance to
be awarded. Although not listed as a relevant factor, it could conceivably
be considered, due to the fact that the list is nonexclusive6 2 However, by
listing the conduct of the spouse seeking maintenance but not mention-
ing the conduct of the supporting spouse, the statute's drafters may have
intended to rely on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteriuscs to
prevent judicial consideration of the conduct of the supporting spouse.
Courts, though, have always considered themselves free to disregard canons
of construction in order to reach a desired result. Therefore, absent a
ruling from the Missouri Supreme Court applying the above mentioned
maxim to this situation and excluding consideration of such conduct, the
legislative attempt to prevent such consideration may not be totally effec-
tive. Furthermore, the language of the applicable section would seem to
permit consideration of the requesting spouse's good conduct, as well
as bad. Permitting consideration of the requesting spouse's good conduct
may enable consideration of the supporting spouse's bad conduct to come
in the back door.64 By showing that the requesting spouse's conduct was
above reproach, the inference would be that he could not possibly have
been responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. Therefore, the sup-
porting spouse must have been at fault. This inference could, no doubt,
affect the court's decision. For this reason evidence of good conduct should
be excluded.
D. Maintenance for Either Spouse
Under the new statutes either spouse is authorized to receive mainte-
nance. However, it is likely to be many years before courts rid them-
selves of the deeply rooted notion that the husband is to be the chief
provider for the family and begin awarding maintenance to men. Few
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (1) (Supp. 1974;75).
60. Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. App. 1973).
61. § 452.335.2(7), RSMo 1973 Supp.
62. § 452.335.2, RSMo 1973 Supp.
63. "When certain persons or things are specified in a law ... an intention
to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred." BLACK's LAw DIcTlONARY
692 (4th ed. 1951).
64. Iowa courts permit introduction of good conduct, but not bad conduct.
In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 351 (Iowa 1971) (dissenting opinion).
One Oregon court suggested that the valuable service performed by the wife in
keeping and raising children should be considered. In: re Marriage of Kitson, 17
Ore. App. 648, 657, 523 P.2d 575, 579 (1974).
[Vol. 41
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men have dared to ask for maintenance and in the extremely rare cases
in which it has been granted, the husband invariably has been inca-
pacitated 65
E. Termination of Maintenance
Under pre-"no fault" statutes, where alimony was based on the husband's
continuing duty of support, most states held that alimony authomatically
terminated upon the remarriage of the wife. By remarrying she acquired
a new right to support.0 6 The state of Iowa has indicated that although
alimony will normally terminate upon remarriage, extraordinary circum-
stances may justify its continuance. 67 Florida courts continue to terminate
alimony upon the remarriage of the supported spouse. This rule is ex-
tended even to rehabilitative alimony68 and a lump sum award to be
paid in installments. 9 Although the Florida statute contains no relevant
provision, the court in Sheffield v. Sheffield 7o held that alimony did not
terminate when the former wife began living with a man. This ruling
was apparently based on the traditional concept of the husband's duty
of support and the theory that marriage provides legal rights not found
in an adulterous relationship.7 1 The Missouri statute72 provides that,
unless agreed otherwise, the obligation for future maintenance payments
terminates on the remarriage of the supported spouse. The statute is
silent as to termination when the supported spouse enters into an adulter-
ous relationship. Therefore, the above mentioned Florida case should be
good precedent for Missouri in such a situation.
Alimony has traditionally been considered to terminate upon the
death of either party. 8 However, in Shepherd v. Shepherd74 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals permitted a wife to recover a maintenance allowance
from her husband's estate. The divorce decree, by providing that mainte-
nance should continue until the wife's death or further orders of the
court, implied that payment should continue beyond the husband's life-
time. At least in Kentucky, maintenance does not terminate as a matter
65. A prime example of the situation where courts will grant a husband
alimony is Kerr v. Kerr, 182 Cal. App. 2d 12, 5 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1960). There,
although using language suggesting a broader view, the court granted alimony
to a husband who had suffered a nervous breakdown and could not work. For
a case denying alimony to a husband, but where it might have been granted had
the wife been seeking alimony, see Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. App. 1972).
66. R. LEvy, supra note 51, at 155.
67. In re Woodward, 229 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Iowa 1975).
68. Rehabilitative alimony is an award to a spouse for a limited period,
during which time that spouse is to acquire or regain skills sufficient to enable
him to adequately support himself. See Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla.
App. 1975).
69. Blackmon v. Blackmon, 307 So. 2d 887, 888-89 (Fla. App. 1974).
70. 310 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. App. 1975).
71. Id.
72. § 452-370.2, RSMo 1973 Supp.
73. See H. CrLAux, supra note 7, at 461-63.
74. 521 S.W.2d 74, 75-76 (Ky. App. 1975).
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of law upon the death of the paying spouse. Missouri courts will probably
follow Shepherd. In Catron v. Catron7r the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Kansas City District, approved the trial court's ruling that payments to
the wife in lieu of alimony were to continue after the husband's death.
The payments were required by a separation agreement which provided
that they were to be made until the death or remarriage of the wife.
IV. IMPACr OF THE NEw STATUTE
The impact of the new Missouri maintenance provision is difficult
to assess. The factors relevant to determining the appropriateness and
amount of maintenance are basically the same as under the old law.
However, under the new statute the court must first determine the exist-
ence of need before proceeding to considerations of duration and amount.
The biggest difference between the new and old laws will probably be
conceptual. Courts will think of maintenance less as compensation to a
divorced spouse and more as a means of supporting one unable to pro-
vide adequately for himself. In considering a grant of maintenance, courts
should not rely on the approach to women's occupational abilities taken
by the United States Supreme Court in Kahn v. Shevin.76 On the basis
of elaborate statistics, the Court held that women as a class were less able
to support themselves than men, and therefore, a Florida statute providing
a special tax benefit for widows, but not for widowers, did not violate
equal protection.77 Such an approach should not be controlling in a
judicial determination whether and how much maintenance should be
awarded. The courts should look objectively to the facts of each individual
case and should not rely solely on any generalized presumptions as to
women's abilities to support themselves. The fundamental consideration
should be whether the particular requesting spouse has the ability to be
self-supporting, or to acquire the skills necessary to become such.
The most significant impact of the new maintenance provision will
be in the consideration of conduct. Under the prior law, one spouse could
use the other's fault as an economic bludgeon. By threatening to pursue
an extortionate award of maintenance under the old law, a wife was
often able to coerce the husband into acceding to her demands for custody
and other matters. The courts will probably recognize that by specifically
listing the conduct of the requesting spouse, the legislature intended
conduct of the supporting spouse to be excluded, and therefore will not
permit conduct of the supporting spouse to be considered. The most com-
mon use of conduct will be to deny maintenance to a spouse whose actions
are so reprehensible that an award of maintenance would be inequitable.
As judicial experience under the new law accumulates, the courts will
be more likely to award temporary rehabilitative maintenance than perma-
nent maintenance. This inclination will continue so long as the number
75. 492 S.W.2d 172, 177-78 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
76. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
77. Id.
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of women in the job market continues to increase, particularly if and
when women's earning power approaches that of men. The courts are
free to award maintenance for a limited time, because the statute authorizes
orders in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems
just.78 However, awards for a limited period should be based upon a
reasonable expectation that some impending change in the financial posi-
tions of the parties will occur. Awards should not be based on "specula-
tion as to the future condition of the parties."79
V. CONCLUSION
Although the new Missouri maintenance provision was designed to
treat male and female spouses equally and to award maintenance in each
case based solely upon the needs of the particular spouses involved, it
is unlikely to have such a sweeping initial effect. Old ideas and prejudices
die slowly. It will probably be many years before courts completely abandon
the notion that the husband is to be the provider and that the wife should
be entitled to his support as a matter of course. However, with the passing
of time, courts will gradually reach the point desired by the drafters of
the new statutes. Just how long this process will take remains to be seen.
GARY L. BREEZEEL
78. § 452.335.2, RSMo 1973 Supp.
79. In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949, 965 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
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